


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
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The Tyranny of the Visible: Problems in the Evaluation of Anti-institutional Radicalism

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
***Abstract.** This paper inspects our understanding of recent organizational innovations taking place at the margins of radical theory and practice. Its central argument is that political science, in its reaction to such innovations, evinces a hierarchical organizational paradigm that both distorts evidence and hampers further research. The paper then explores the nature of this perceptual failure, tries a variety of conceptual resources which might overcome it and concludes with a re-assessment of the organizational innovations themselves.*



In AD 9, the Caeliae family lost their favourite son. Marcus, a young and ambitious centurion, had mysteriously disappeared, along with the rest of Legion XX, on a distant border of the empire. No one could tell his family what had happened. There were no bones to help them grieve. Left to endlessly imagine his fate, and with their worst fears fuelled by rumour, they tried their best to honour him. And so they built a cenotaph in Rome, inscribing it with a heartfelt request to place his bones there, should they ever be found.¹

Radicalism, it seems, has been comprehensively defeated. The demise of socialism and the triumph of liberal democracy has made the world safe for global capitalism and elite rule. This victory is not limited to the realm of power politics. Radical political thought also has been unable to offer alternatives, and now occupies the fringes of academic debate, where it is safely separated from questions of practice. In such a hostile and depoliticized environment, there is widespread pessimism and a

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
general 'exhaustion of utopian energies' (Habermas, 1989). Nowadays, we must live with our collective addictions: there will be no revolution, no let-up to our cruelty, no end to our self-destruction.

Of course, things are not all bad. Critical political thought has, if nothing else, learned from repeated failure, and become rather good at explaining why things do not change.² Forced to move behind the empirical victories of capitalism and competitive elitism (Schumpeter, 1966: 284–5) to explore their attendant hegemonies of culture and consciousness, real progress has been made in understanding political struggles, not only over the distribution of resources, but also over questions of culture, knowledge and identity.³ In addition, radicalism has uncovered a profound antipathy to difference lying at the very heart of the modernist emancipatory project,⁴ it has taken on board the dangers of utopian thinking and it has rejected the strategy of vanguardism.

At the same time, there have been developments in radical political practice which, though marginalized, do raise important questions. Participants in new social movements, (newer) grassroots direct action groups (Epstein, 1996: 127–39), carnivalesque events (Cohen, 1993), decentralizing initiatives in local democracy (Stewart et al., 1994; Burns et al., 1994), networks of radical groups, workplace democracy (Carnoy and Shearer, 1980; Jones and Svejnar, 1982), and even corporate project teams (Castells, 1996: Ch. 3), are experimenting with anti-hierarchical political forms. In the places of our everyday lives, a new anti-institutional orientation is in evidence.

Yet these practical initiatives, particularly as they address questions of organization and strategy, have received a decidedly limited theoretical treatment. Either simply ignored as pubescent (by statist political science), dismissed as irrelevant to real questions of power (Liberalism, Marxism), or lost in a crescendo of aesthetic analysis (postmodernism, post-structuralism), the organizational and strategic challenge set by radical political initiatives remains unmet. Specifically, we need to know whether the localized, fragmented, face-to-face and strongly anti-institutional orientation of such initiatives could ever hope to deliver a radical practice which might change the world, or whether it will turn out to be yet another bloody cul-de-sac. There is, therefore, a great deal at stake in precisely how these radical forms are evaluated and theorized.

This paper seeks to further our understanding of the organizational innovations currently taking place at the margins of radical theory and practice. The argument it presents is not a strategic utopian design for their improved operation, nor does it inspect relations between local and global processes or between culture and politics. Rather, the concern here is the chronic inability of mainstream political science and, indeed, many political actors, to grasp the importance of anti-institutional and disorganized political forms. The central argument is that our evaluation of such forms remains severely constrained by a recurrent perceptual and cognitive failure, and that this results in their being all too easily



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dismissed. The paper explores the nature of this failure, which it characterizes as an institutionalized illusion of surprising stability. It also tries out a variety of conceptual resources which might enable us to see through this illusion. The conclusion reached is that certain kinds of apparently disorganized radical collective actions, though so hard to see as to be almost impossible to accurately evaluate, in fact pose the single most significant threat to the power of global, national and even local elites. Anti-institutional radical forms have, therefore, because of a kind of tyranny of the visible, been seriously underestimated. This paper inquires into why and how this has occurred.

When we look at anti-institutional, non-hierarchical forms of organization, at radical, local, grassroots deliberative groups and spontaneous micro-politics, we see parochialism, irrelevance and idealism. Almost all of us intuitively assume such forms to be hopelessly inefficient, quite incapable of running complex activities, quite unable to co-ordinate action in such a way as to deploy, or even to adequately resist, state power. At the root of this negative evaluation is the widely held belief that, if you want to win any given power struggle, if you want to survive against the others, you must be organized.

When we inspect such intuitive assumptions, we find the concept of organization being interpreted in a quite particular way. In order to distinguish this interpretation from the one advanced in current anti-institutional political activity, we will hereafter refer to it as 'hierarchism.'⁵ Hierarchism holds that to act together successfully in the world necessarily entails a hierarchy of command, centralized control and the institutionalization of roles of expertise and leadership. In this aspect, it emerges directly from the long history of sovereign/subject structures of power⁶ and the organizational categories of elite rule. Yet hierarchism also encompasses modes of action co-ordination more akin to bureaucratic structures, for it relies heavily on the division of labour, the systematization of tasks and the immunization of elite decision-makers against input from those defined as lacking expertise (Weber, 1946: 196–266). Finally, hierarchism deploys what Habermas would term instrumental reason, for it stresses, in its orientation to success, the gaining of structural complexity and the systematic substitution of discursive judgment and deliberative argumentation by written rules and impartial, formalized, procedures (Habermas, 1968: 17–18; Keane, 1984: 119).

Hierarchism is, therefore, the way we understand the problematic of organization. It is so ingrained into our political culture as to severely limit the set of possible strategic and procedural solutions available to us. When an army, government, political party, radical movement, trade union, voluntary group or departmental meeting faces organizational difficulties, it is likely to reach for solutions which strongly express this hierarchical orientation. Hierarchism is the paradigm within which we approach such difficulties. It is the way we look, the way we study, the



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way we do our science (Burrell, 1997). And it strongly affects what we can see.

Hierarchism is also, at least to some extent, an expression of the Western 'dream of order' (Bauman, 1992: xi), we find at the heart of the enlightenment project. While Hinduism counsels resignation and Buddhism embraces suffering, we respond to contingency and the inescapability of our own death by pitting our will against the world, by warring with nature, with our internal selves, and with all those who are different from ourselves (Bauman, 1991). Having most recently learned to seek comfort and mastery in scientific control, we sought to impose an artificial order upon our political world, a project in which there have been both successes and failures.⁷

In the history of political thought, the crucial moment is perhaps Hobbes's *Leviathan*, where what is natural is disorder, where disorder is framed solely in terms of its dangers, and where freedom and the co-ordination of action always require institutionalized force. Most of us shake our heads and smile at Hobbes's absolutism, but it is more difficult to free oneself from the hierarchism of his premises (Hobbes, 1958).⁸ To do so entails seeing out of the hierarchic paradigm, imagining that collective action can be co-ordinated by other means and even moving away from the reflex equation of political order with freedom which is so entrenched in the liberal discourse we have inherited from the enlightenment.

Here, though, we confront the crux of our difficulties. For, if the easy dismissal of anti-institutionalism is correct, hierarchism must be the *only* adequate means of co-ordinating collective human action. By suggesting that we are in fact rather biased in the way we look at organizational questions, relying as we do on hierarchical assumptions, we raise the possibility that there are other ways to co-ordinate collective action; ways that are invisible from within the hierarchic paradigm. If this is the case, then we should be able to show precisely what it is that hierarchism cannot see, as well as giving an explanation for such blindness.

Yet how can we break out of a way of seeing which is automatic, unchallenged and, to us, obviously *the* way to see? The possibility here is that, in terms of organizational questions, we are naive realists: we gaze upon what we assume to be the real world, the only possible world, the world that others who disagree with us are just incapable of seeing. If hierarchism is an example of naive realism, then it is guilty of a perceptual failure which would render its unquestioning dismissal of anti-institutional forms open to question.

Showing that a position is naive in its assumptions or fails to adequately perceive reality requires that we overcome a number of classic difficulties. We would need, first, to be able to identify what is real and to fully justify such an identification. Second, we would need to show how the reality gives rise to the 'false' appearance. Third, we are required to somehow draw attention to an object which is currently outside aware-



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ness. Where something is invisible, it is, from the point of view of the one who cannot see, non-existent. The invisible object can enter awareness only when some additional sensory input, such as touch or hearing, or some heightened sense, such as that afforded by scientific instrumentation, at last discloses its presence. The disclosure of an object which was formerly invisible to us is an act of learning. It gives us greater confidence that we are now looking at what is real, it allows us to theorize why we could not see before.⁹

Sometimes, what enters awareness are phenomena which indicate the presence of something which, nonetheless, cannot be seen. Here we detect certain effects, and, using a combination of reason and intuition, we learn to understand what is causing these effects (Wolff, 1988: 25–7). An example might be the deflection of radio waves on the edge of the solar system, here indicating the presence of a new planet, as yet unseen. If hierarchism is indeed incapable of perceiving certain kinds of political forms, then we should be able to reveal these forms, to point to them in the world, or at least, by using some additional sensory input, to indicate their effects. How, then, can we disclose these forms which are invisible to us? What effects would indicate their presence? How can we learn to see in such a way that is not impeded by hierarchism?

Of course, learning to see has always been a central concern of political thought, and in its history we find two distinct approaches to enlarging our perception: those of logic and rhetoric. Hobbes is a clear example of the first, for he sought to demonstrate a politics by logical derivation from a nascent particle physics, whereas Machiavelli told a series of stories from history, cautionary tales if you will, thereby hoping to give new insight, not so much by rational derivation, but by rhetoric and example. In our search for conceptual resources with which to understand the poverty of our evaluation of anti-institutional forms, both rational analysis and narrative might be helpful.

Rome saw itself as the champion of organization. Augustus, surveying his massive empire, deemed the Germanic tribes ripe for Roman Law (Webster, 1985: 34). And so he dispatched Publius Quinctilius Varus to the frontier, placing beneath his command a crack force of five legions, among them the XXth. Varus was a small and rather serious man, a lawyer, not highly born, whose many successes were more the product of self-belief. He was a father, a citizen, passionate about the greatness of Rome, fond of detailing the virtues of discipline and the many benefits of hierarchy. On occasion, he guessed his lack of military experience was a frequent subject for discussion among his men. For a whole summer, he fortified his encampment on the Rhine, setting up lines of supply, drilling, waiting. Finally, his scouts detected a group of renegade German auxiliaries operating deep in the forest beyond the border. Varus, confident that this was his chance of vindication and glory, led three of his legions over the river in order to give chase. Among the soldiers who waded through the muddy water that day, at last to emerge panting,



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grinning, on the far side of the river, was the young centurion, Marcus Caelius.

One effect we can discern, perhaps indicating the presence of what hierarchism cannot see, is fear. We have always feared the unrestrained collective, the mobilized populace, the blood-thirsty mob. Whenever these apparently disorganized and ephemeral political forms force themselves upon the public stage, they are abruptly treated as highly dangerous and as posing a serious threat to our freedom. Now the institutions of elite power will spare no violence in order to put them down. In such instances, hierarchism shows that its accusation, that such forms are lacking in organization, in fact masks a deep terror, one which drives processes of othering and vindictive demonization. So acute is our fear of disorganization that there must be something out there which, even though usually invisible, nevertheless causes us real concern.

For moderns, then, what threatens, what terrifies, is precisely ourselves, acting together, indulging in orgies of civil disorder. *This*, said Hobbes, is why we need government. In concert, without a conductor backed up by force, we cannot be trusted. With frightening efficiency, we set about killing each other. Hierarchism therefore seems to hold two contradictory positions. On the one hand it sees anti-institutionalism as ineffective, irrelevant, risible and quite unable to co-ordinate collective human action. On the other it accuses it of being dangerous, as able to mobilize and co-ordinate in a quite terrifying way, as being somehow also *too* effective. This contradiction haunts the history of democratic thought, where we see elite and hierarchical control endlessly justified by warnings against both the 'bovine stupidity' of the people (Schumpeter, 1966) and their dangerous fanaticism.

The perceptual and cognitive impediments we have been exploring under the term hierarchism therefore have complex intellectual and institutional roots, emanating as they do from a particular cultural mode of engagement with contingency. We seek to control and master our political world, we confront disorder as our enemy, we demonize non-hierarchical and anti-institutional forms. It is this process which renders us unable to see them clearly, if at all. So perceptually compromised, our evaluation of such radical forms is severely impaired, causing us to select solutions from a constrained set of hierarchical, instrumental and managerial solutions. The problem may be even more serious still, for this perceptual failure seems to so distort our understanding that, no matter how carefully we look, we always, inevitably, confirm our original view. For some reason, organizationally, we do not learn.

The difficulty, again, is that the invisible cannot be revealed by squinting carefully, it does not disclose itself to empirical investigation. The racist gazes upon the world and finds his distorted prejudice confirmed. This is the nature of an optical illusion, even, or especially, one which achieves its effect not by physics but by the social construction of experience. Similarly, hierarchic organizational values seem somehow



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
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to ensure that anti-institutional forms always appear to lack organization, and that their ineffectiveness is plain for all to see. This is the meaning of 'paradigm blindness': the investigations of ordinary empirical science, bounded by its paradigm, cannot transcend its conceptual expectations (Kuhn, 1962). If hierarchism mistakenly believes a single type of collective action to be viable, this is one thing. But if it also *perceives* no other kind of collective action, if no amount of experience could *ever* succeed in overcoming its perceptual immunization against falsification, then this would go some way towards explaining why the theoretical treatment of newly emerging political forms is so impoverished, and why we learn so little from experience. To assert, with greater confidence, that the negative evaluation of anti-organizational forms in fact emerges from a strongly ideological and empirically self-confirming set of assumptions, we need to understand how such a perceptual failure can be so durable. Specifically, what mechanism might account for hierarchism's ability to distort the world in such a way as to make it appear to confirm its expectations?

When trying to account for the tyranny of the visible, the best guide is Marx. His attempts to reveal the subtle ways in which capitalism deceives its participants show also how it mystifies and masquerades as objectivity. He tracked two kinds of deception, each generating its own form of false consciousness, each enabling capitalism to hide its true nature and to disable those who might, if they saw the truth, resist.

First, Marx was much troubled by the problem of limited perspective or partiality of view. At the micro-level, in people's work and daily lives, he argued, capitalism conceals the source of its profits, its apparent super-productivity and even the nature of its exploitation. Only at the macro-level, only in the system as a whole, does profit equate with the total surplus value extracted from the entire working class (Wolff, 1984: 129). Here, he claimed, the one who steals the surpluses generated by them all labouring together can be identified (Marx, 1867: 322), and the truly exploitative nature of capitalism is revealed. Marx's conceptual instrumentation, whether its equations are right or wrong, is designed to show that capitalism is, in reality, a system, a global process, a huge wood. It is not, *as it appears*, a single tree, no matter how that tree might lie astride our path and dominate our lives.

This first kind of perceptual failure, then, which takes the form of a chronic partiality of view, or parochialism, prevents us from seeing the aggregate of our actions, the big picture. In this way it operates to screen off the *social* costs of labour over-utilization (Marx, 1867: 270), of unemployment, of pollution and the economic devastation of poorer countries, so allowing capitalism to appear efficient. It also debilitates local actors. For them, partiality is a form of blindness. It results in poor political judgment, divisive competition and the inability to co-ordinate resistance effectively. Yet this kind of deception *can* be overcome, if only by learning to see from a new perspective. This was Marx's hope, that



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
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local actors could pool their knowledge, overcome their partiality, and so cast off their chains.

The same cannot be said for the second kind of deception he detected. Here we confront social constructions which *appear* to be physical processes. As social and symbolic beings, as believing beings, our imaginings come, for us, to appear real. Marx called this our 'religious reflex'. In the opening chapter of *Capital*, he shows how the value of a commodity appears real while being, in fact, 'a mysterious thing' (Marx, 1867: 72), concealing a particular set of social relations. Here, a 'social product' (Marx, 1867: 74) comes to appear as natural (Geras, 1972: 288), and no amount of evidence to the contrary (Hodgson, 1981: 98), nor change in perspective, can ever dispel its deceptive¹⁰ appearance. Capitalism mystifies, it fetishizes, it reifies,¹¹ and, in so doing, generates illusions which are durable and almost impossible to dispel. Marx used science, but he also played with language and form in order to tease out such delusions, to encourage us to see differently (Wolff, 1988). He tried to show that the value category was a deception, that capitalism's inequalities only *appeared* natural and that its institutions were merely self-legitimizing (Roemer, 1982: 380). But he knew that reification resists empirical falsification. He understood that this kind of illusion was almost inescapable. In cases such as this, it's as if the object of perception actively conditions the way we look, inviting us to make the mistake and we cannot, therefore, get behind the immediate evidence of appearance. As with the self-fulfilling prophecy, with paradigm blindness, and with prejudice, we here confront a false world which is somehow self-confirming.

The tyranny of the visible which so hampers hierarchistic attempts to evaluate anti-institutional forms is thus to be attributed both to subjective aberrations of perception, as with partiality, and to a combination of subjective and objective tendencies towards distortion, as with reification. This heady mix suggests ways in which the myth of hierarchism achieves its extraordinary stability and why invitations to transcend it cannot be simple empirical demonstrations. After all, empirical inquiry alone cannot distinguish between the natural and the socially constructed, for both present measurable material phenomena. To make such a distinction we must use a more critical faculty.

It is, therefore, hard to find clear examples of such a complex and subtle process, though New Labour's recent use of market research affords evidence of a hierarchic orientation and the inability to see alternative solutions. Confronted with an increasing distance from the populace, the party has responded to the need for more information on citizens' opinions by expanding their use of focus groups into a 5,000 strong 'People's Panel'.¹² But the set of possible solutions is already limited by an assumed equation between winning a competition for votes and the efficient management of democratic debate. Initiatives to increase citizen participation were not considered, nor were possibilities of grassroots



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
organizing, nor of democratizing the party. What is visible, and, therefore, what is selected, is a hierarchic solution involving a domesticated public, from which the milk of participation can be obtained without any of the risks involved with mobilization. Of course, Labour may genuinely want to improve our democracy. Yet when they look, and no matter how *carefully* they look, they do not see.

The centurions shouted orders and the men obeyed, stumbling forward, panting, onto the far bank of the river. The land into which they marched was like nothing they had ever seen before. Criss-crossed by deep ravines and fast running streams, the progress of the legions was constantly hampered by thick vegetation. Often, they found that a particular ravine was so tight and clogged with trees that they could not pass, and so they had to retrace their steps. By the third day, it had begun to rain heavily. As the march continued, the troops and baggage handlers became strung out in a long line. Unable to operate on the periphery of the column, his scouts could not inform Varus as to the position of the German auxiliaries ahead. Gradually, the simple difficulty of moving forward came to occupy all the Roman efforts. Heads down, feet in mud, slick ruts filling with dark water. No. Not this way. Turn around! Stalled, waiting, they squinted into the dark forest on either side. Thick twisted trees obscured their view. Rain ran down their faces.

One difficulty with the accusation of invisibility is that it's only ever a good argument when made retrospectively, by which time it is largely redundant. Prior to the object's appearance, the claim appears absurd. Afterwards, when the object is there for all to see, the claim seems obvious, clearly true all along. It's worth thinking about the way the accusation operates in the faculty of moral judgment. Where something appears to us to be of moral import, such as the suffering of a loved one, we weigh up the question of our actions in moral terms. What should we do? What is the 'right' thing to do? Which moral principle applies in this case? What sort of person do I want to be?

Really serious failures to make good moral judgments: Eichman, Dahmer, Karadic, are not quite due to incorrect moral *reasoning*. They arise, rather, from the complete failure to *perceive* the suffering of others. Vetlesen shows that the perception of another's suffering is the precondition for all moral judgment. Without the emotional response of empathy, he argues, the suffering of another never appears as an object of moral import (Vetlesen, 1994), and, consequently, never gets reasoned about at all. So, Eichmann's failure was not bad judgment, qua bad thinking. It was due, rather, to his complete absence of judgment.¹³ The suffering of Jews, of individual Jews, was, to Eichmann, invisible (Vetlesen, 1994: 106).

Similarly, when we watch the rapist or the child molester discussing his crime, we observe the same inability to *see* the suffering he causes. Lacking empathy, which, in moral judgment, provides perceptual access to the weal and woe of others, the child molester exhibits the bounded confines of his visible world. And because we see *more* than he, we can




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say his identity is impoverished, twisted by trauma and mechanisms of defence, in denial. In this way, the one who does not see is the exemplar of bad judgment.

Hierarchism would seem to be just this kind of impoverishment. In preventing us from seeing any other form of collective action, it distorts our evaluation of political circumstances and impedes our judgments about what we should do. The terror of disorganization has come, unreflectively, to drive our responses, so that we generate an ornate body of knowledge about acting in the world which completely misses non-hierarchical forms of action. This body of knowledge is both expressed in, and fuelled by, generations of political science which sees only the state. Paul Hirst's historical comments suggest that a period of external industrial conflict gave rise to an exclusive orientation to the state, both by collectivism and individualism, and that this extinguished associationism as a species of ideas (Hirst, 1993: 114). And feminism has revealed how much is purposely occluded by attending only to 'high' politics. Yet, whatever its cause, we have settled into an orthodoxy of 'self-evident' truths concerning the ineffectiveness of non-hierarchical co-ordination and the unassailability of current structures of power.

So, when the academy does discover modes of institutional life beneath the level of the state, as it has recently in the debates over civil society (Keane, 1988), it retains its hierarchistic orientation. This results in highly generalized and abstracted definitions of social categories which at no point engage with the quite distinct modes of action co-ordination that actually occur within the networks of everyday life. We are treated to accounts of civil society¹⁴ far above the communicative complexities of civil interaction, benedictions to the public sphere¹⁵ which do not inspect the actual functioning of those very deliberative groups which make it up and investigations of democratic culture¹⁶ which concentrate on what is still an elevated layer of elite institutions dominated by the politics of proxy and bureaucratic procedure. It is commendable that the struggle to patch up the threadbare legitimacy of liberal democracy has at last driven us to look below the level of the state, and in particular at civil society. Yet what we end up studying are think tanks, NGOs and local government, planning and public service committees. While those practising and theorizing community organization (Fisher and Kling, 1993), user participation (Lindow, 1993) and adult education explore the realities of micro-democracy, democratic theory endlessly reinvents a domesticated liberal democracy (Coole, 1996).

The accusation here, then, is that we have mistakenly institutionalized, and internalized, the view that non-hierarchical action is inefficient and irrelevant to the more important concerns of high politics. We might borrow James Scott's concept of the 'public transcript' in order to further our understanding of how a particular way of seeing becomes institutionalized. Scott defines the public transcript as that observable symbolic discourse which expresses and confirms a political order's existing



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
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relations of dominance and subordination (Scott, 1990). In such a discourse, which is, of course, backed up by force, slaves acquiesce to the demands of their masters, workers agree to sell their labour power, the electorate votes and students do their assigned reading.

Hierarchism, as a public transcript, presents us with an account of history in which power structures operate with complete hegemony (Scott, 1990: 67–8, 71–85), then periodically, inexplicably, there are eruptions against such structures (Scott, 1990: 86, 224; Lefebvre, 1968). Such a view holds that, though there have been many moments in history when the public transcript was openly challenged on a massive scale, there will never be such an eruption again. This is because there is, at present, no possible alternative to the hierarchism of liberal democracy.¹⁷ So sure are we in our own triumph, so naive in our realism, that we still unhesitatingly export our strongly hierarchic interpretation of democracy to other countries. Modern, Western, male political science meditates upon, and almost exclusively upon, hierarchical activity. It is a science largely about elites. Whether right or left wing in one's political orientation, alternative political forms are thus seen to be obviously ineffective, or insufficiently hierarchical. The apparently clear visual evidence for this is, as we are here exploring, not safe. In fact it is a social construction, or, more accurately, a set of defensive imaginings reified into a self-confirming public transcript (Scott, 1990: 101).¹⁸ The tyranny of the visible, now complete, cannot even see its enemy.

In a tent in the dripping forest, the war council of the Cherusci, the largest of the Germanic tribes, sat and talked about the Romans. They were crossing the river now, moving in a long line towards them over the plateau. Arminius and his friends knew them well. He himself had fought in their legions at one time, and his brother worshipped them, hoping above all to one day be Roman himself. As the scouts arrived, panting, giving their news of the column's advance, the council made its plans: a tactical withdrawal, an ambush, slaughter, then a general uprising of the downtrodden tribes. Arminius, no rude savage, but fully cognisant of the language and civilization of Rome, would succeed where Hannibal had failed. Swiftmess, that was the key; invisibility; small units operating without centralized command and control, yet nevertheless co-ordinated, brought together in their actions by a common hatred. They would teach the Emperor and his subjects a lesson they would not easily forget.

Beneath the public transcript of hierarchism is a further discourse which is invisible. Scott uses the term 'hidden transcript' here to illuminate a quite different series of expressions and actions. Once beyond the surveillance of their masters, slaves grumble and ridicule, workers start rumours and carry out anonymous acts of vandalism, students feign stupidity and drag their feet (Scott, 1990: 133). These are cultures of resistance (Mbembe, 1992), with their own ways of communicating, their own spaces where they can interact freely, beyond the eyes of elites. These are disorganized networks, horizontal and largely bereft of hierar-



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
chical structure, along which information passes with tremendous speed. Always simmering beneath the surface, they only occasionally billow up to visibly challenge their oppressors. Scott invites us to peer into this different world, acknowledging that it is a hard one to see.

One reason for its invisibility is that the hidden transcript is quite purposefully concealed (Scott, 1990: 4, 32, 40, 132). When faced with an overwhelming and vindictive power, it is important for subordinates to use different forms of communication and action, and to hide them. Only when this transcript becomes too vital and explosive for existing elites to contain do subordinates allow it to become visible (Scott, 1990: 202–27). In such moments, the hidden transcript directly challenges its public oppressor. These occasional eruptions tear freedoms, resources and rights from the hands of elites; though later, as the public transcript of hierarchism reasserts itself, these eruptions are glossed over, and we fashion histories of institutional reform in which freedoms are bequeathed from above.

Another reason this transcript is hidden is that we lack the perceptual mechanisms to detect it. Certainly, as Marx showed in his analysis of reification, some aspects of the social world seem to conceal themselves, to invite us to make perceptual mistakes. But, when we add to this our strongly religious reflex to think hierarchically, to interpret contrary evidence in such a way as to merely support our assumptions, we find that our way of seeing denies the existence of certain forms of political action, and that we are continually hampered by a kind of tyranny of the visible. The resulting perceptual failure means that we cannot easily gain the additional sensory input required to reveal their presence.

The tyranny of the visible makes it hard for us to see, but it cannot take away the fear. Indeed, one fears most precisely what cannot be seen. We noted that our fear of disorganized forms, while not giving an accurate account of the object itself, does alert us to its effects. If we combine the indirect awareness that fear affords with Vetlesen's work on empathy as the perceptual precondition for all moral judgment, we begin to delineate a perceptual tool for revealing that transcript which has so far remained hidden. Fear, when functional, becomes mistrust and suspicion. Suspicion is the emotional/intuitive precondition for recognizing the object as one of political import, for questioning, and thus seeing beyond the visible public transcript of hierarchism.

Suspicion alerts us to the encroachment of hierarchical forms, it makes us watch with vigilance for their tendency to remove sovereignty and pass it, through structures of representation and proxy, to ruling elites. Hierarchism is the paradigm of sovereigns. Suspicion is the perceptual mechanism whereby subordinates can breach the bounded visibility of their oppressors and so remain radical. Without it, we remain blind to a whole array of collective human activities, including those radical possibilities that, even if at this stage only marginally, continue to oppose liberal democracy's triumphant construction of its public transcript. Without



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suspicion, all our efforts at resistance merely reconstruct the oppressive methods of hierarchism.

Having crossed the river and entered the Teutoberg Forest, the three legions under Varus's command were never seen again. They vanished without trace. Weeks passed with no news, and even the reconnaissance patrols from the main camp found nothing that would indicate either their whereabouts or their fate. At one point, the remaining troops managed to locate a handful of locals who had been in Varus's baggage train, now back in their Cherusci villages, but they could get little sense out of them. It seemed there had been a battle, but none could (or would) say what had occurred, nor could they help find the site of the encounter. Weeks passed into months, and it was during this time that Marcus's family built the cenotaph to their son in Rome. Shaken, Augustus dispatched more troops to the frontier, offered rewards for information and quietly abandoned the project of civilizing the Germanic tribes.

There are, of course, a number of theorists whose suspicion is exemplary. Foucault is among them. His Nietzschean mistrust of power, of its expression even in knowledge and identity, led him to a searching critique of the dividing practices which operate under liberal democracy. Benjamin too, in his valorization of mistrust, presents an admirable degree of suspicion. And Luxemburg, with her account of the mass strike, sought to describe a quite different mode of revolutionary practice than that offered by her contemporaries, whose hierarchistic visions she so mistrusted (Walters, 1971).

Suspicion of the public transcript and a willingness to interrogate settled understandings are also modelled in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, who invite us into the techniques of the nomadic war machine (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 351–423). They disclose the gains made by the nomads: chariots, cavalry, strategies, and they track the tyranny of the visible as an over-coding (May, 1994: 95), by which they mean a self-stabilizing deception propagated by institutionalized power which, as it becomes more sedentary, gains representative structures and writes a history in which all advances are appropriated as their own. They also describe the non-battle, the riot, the guerrilla war, the fast flowing hordes. Hierarchism, in their metaphors, spreads upwards like a tree, branching its structures away from a thick central trunk. Other, non-hierarchical forms of collective action are likened to rhizomes, matted as crab-grass. Here, intensities circulate along neural networks, through bodies without organs, seeking lines of flight. These disorganized forms challenge the machine of the state with viral micro-operations. Deleuze and Guattari try to show what cannot be seen, yet they do not attempt to demonstrate empirically the confines of hierarchism. They do not catalogue its absurdities, its distorted appearances, nor even the desperate violence of the inequality it maintains, for they know that these are invisible.

Hierarchism is an organizational vision obsessed with efficiency, yet the fact that it does not deliver efficiency is a hard way to learn the lesson.



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Certainly, the Emperor has no clothes. But hierarchism is self-confirming: a perceptual aberration, immunized against revelation. So Deleuze and Guattari concentrate on delivering a series of micro-lessons in suspicious thinking, in this way to practise going behind hierarchism in order to recover what we can now characterize as rhizomatic action. Yet, though they give the metaphor, they do not address, in concrete terms, the problem of how action is co-ordinated in such forms. Their enemy is the public transcript of Western philosophy and its concomitant identities and distortions of desire. In so shying away from the concept of agency, they become strangely enmeshed in an individualistic discourse of transgression.¹⁹

If we are to recover the hidden transcript of rhizomatic action, to assess the modes of its effectiveness and legitimacy, and so to learn the fate of the Roman legions at Teutoberg Forest, we must begin by acknowledging the seething mass of resistance that lies behind the sanitized history of modern states. From the pre-Westphalian conflicts of warrior societies (Van Creveld, 1991) to the extraordinary violence deployed to mould absolutist states (Anderson, 1979), conflict has always been a fact of human society. Since the capture of organized violence by a single set of institutions, and its subsequent assumption of legalized legitimation (Weber, 1978: 215ff.), such conflicts have either smouldered beneath the smooth contours of the state or come under the descriptive rubrics of terrorism or vandalism.

Often, ongoing cultures of resistance rear up and directly challenge the power of the state, some very effectively, and examples abound in the history of religious struggles, agricultural uprisings, labour movements and secessionist rebellions. In this century, major powers have been defeated in guerrilla actions, and western societies are rife with barely concealed resistance to the most desperate and ongoing inequalities. We live now in states of micro-civil war (Enzensberger, 1994). The extraordinary suffering of excluded groups continues, as does the spoiling of our ordinary lives, even when the news media have lost interest in them. It requires a lot of money to maintain a privatized familial lifestyle which excludes this ongoing violence from view. As we have already noted, however, fear, an altogether more discerning sense, is more difficult to remove.

The hidden transcript is a product of the extraordinary vitality of rhizomatic action, the richness of its various cultural and political forms and its occasional effectiveness.²⁰ Glimpses of such activities are afforded in the evident capacity of Danes in the face of Nazi power to collectively and overnight place a yellow star on an entire nation's coats, in striking miners' wives' ability to agitate for, and support, their embattled communities²¹ and in the mass mobilization of citizens which brought down the puppet regimes of Eastern Europe. There have also been great refusals, like the boycott of the Nike Corporation by black youth prompted by Public Enemy's exposure of racist hiring practices, the resistance to



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Shell's dumping of the Brent Spa and the city of Liverpool's boycott of the *Sun* newspaper following its reporting of the Hillsborough disaster. There was also the extraordinary collective response to the death of Princess Diana. These are glimpses of an alternative form of collective action of a quite different nature to that of hierarchism. These are rhizomatic activities, flat networks of communication, lacking centralized guidance yet somehow with the capacity to co-ordinate effectively collective action.

From within the bounded visibility²² of the public transcript of hierarchism, such activities are either completely invisible (Scott, 1990: 17, 62, 89 note 44), or regarded as having nothing to do with politics, as marginal, ineffective, doomed to failure and inconsequential.²³ This was precisely the reaction that greeted feminism's insight that 'the personal is political'. Such 'political' activity, far beneath the level of the state, remains largely invisible to mainstream political science (Phillips, 1991).

And, of course, as we have already noted, should such rhizomatic forms erupt or appear successful in any way, they are immediately branded as anti-democratic. This charge raises an important question, one which we have so far not inspected. Certainly, not all rhizomatic action is democratic, and, just like hierarchical forms, some examples are thoroughly distasteful. If we wanted to discern whether or not the internal workings of a given example were democratic or not, we would need to deploy a theory of legitimacy, a set of evaluative criteria, perhaps along the lines laid out by Jürgen Habermas.²⁴ Yet our primary concern here is not so much to decide which rhizomatic actions are, and which are not, acceptable, so much as to show that their occurrence evinces other forms of action co-ordination which are always and unreflectively rejected. The primacy of this concern is validated by the apparent willingness of liberal democratic states to smash such forms, no matter whether they are internally democratic or not. Democratic states are thus revealed to be more concerned to police the public transcript of hierarchism than they are with any genuine interest in anti-institutional possibilities for democratic deepening.

Following such eruptions, when the dust settles, we find political scientists telling us again that no revolution ever resulted in democracy, that victory only follows upon organization, that political order is a necessary condition of freedom.²⁵ They teach that we are fools and cannot rule ourselves, that autonomy requires our adherence to constitutional limits placed upon us by others (Wolin, 1994b: 29–58) and that liberal democracy is the only possible world. We largely believe them. Once again, the tyranny of the visible is unassailable. The orthodoxy of hierarchism, lacking suspicion, finds not only its analytics impaired (Scott, 1990: 13), but also its actions. It results in our spoiling those few opportunities which do emerge for open deliberation about those concerns that affect us all, so that, even when we change elites, we nevertheless continue to alienate our autonomy to proxies, to replicate illegitimate structures in our decision-making and to institutionalize hierarchically every inch of our collective lives.²⁶



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This creeping illegitimacy needs suspicion, mistrust, vigilance. Without it, hierarchism continues, and we find ourselves again ruled over, subjects of an alienated power, expending all our efforts to exercise some minimal control over elites who imagine, or at least want us to imagine, that they represent us. To trust the public transcript is to screen off the very possibility of a politics which might be our own, legitimate yet also effective, disorganized yet co-ordinated. Regarding alternative and radical political forms, then, we should reject a negative evaluation which is based on nothing more than a systematic perceptual distortion.

Six years later, a reconnaissance patrol finally found Marcus Caelius's bones. Tacitus recounts the moment when the soldiers stepped out into a long thin clearing, deep in the Teutoberg Forest:

Across the open ground were whitening bones, scattered where men had fled, or heaped up where they had made a stand. Splintered weapons and horses' limbs lay there, and human heads, fastened to tree-trunks. In nearby groves were the barbaric altars at which they had sacrificed the tribunes and centurions in cold blood. (Tacitus, 1972, Ann. i, 61–2)²⁷

The discovery sent shock waves throughout the empire. In the capital itself, there was panic (Keppie, 1984: 168; Luttwak, 1976: 24). It was true, then, what they said about the barbarians: they were savages, they sacrificed to hungry gods. Rumours of imminent invasion were rife, slaves imagined their freedom at last assured, senators moved their mouths but could not explain how three crack legions could possibly be overwhelmed by little more than a disorganized horde.

How indeed? Batista asked this question, as did the Russians in Afghanistan and America after Vietnam. It appears, from within the confines of hierarchism, that large, organized and structured forces will always prevail over disorganized bands. Yet there are clearly instances in history where something rather different appears.²⁸ As at Teutoberg Forest, the easy equation between hierarchism and effectiveness is at last called into question.

The effectiveness of hierarchism turns on its capacity for simplification. By institutionalizing conduits for information collection and dissemination, by concentrating decision-making power on centralized nodes, processes of communication and command are *limited* in such a way as to enable the delivery of efficiency. In complete contrast to this, the effectiveness of rhizomatic action derives from its complexity. Information, here passing along a myriad of everyday passages: face-to-face discussion, non-verbal communication, and, indeed, every available medium, travels *exponentially* through a network of individuals (Scott, 1990: 151).

We can see this process at work in the movement of rumour. In, for example, Lefebvre's work on *The Great Fear of 1789*, our attention is called to the extraordinary capacity of flat rhizomatic networks to move information, fire-like, across the countryside. Because it travels via the everyday communicative practices of individuals in their social and



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material interactions, the rumour moves with tremendous speed.²⁹ The complexity of this network derives precisely from its neural structure; it is far more effective than the institutionalized conduits we find sedimented for the exchange of information in hierarchical structures. Similarly, rhizomatic decision-making, because it occurs in fragmented form, need not wait for the institution at the centre. Loosely connected units or bands are each free to initiate action, to deploy the local knowledge which is uniquely their own, and thereby to respond with both speed and creativity.

This decentralization of decision-making power, however, cannot alone account for the level of effectiveness, sacrifice, energy and commitment we witness in rhizomatic action. For this we must delve deeper into the innermost workings of those groupings which make up such activity.

There was shouting. Way down the line of troops, out of sight, the rear of the Roman column was being attacked. Varus tried to keep them moving, hoping to gather his forces on open ground. What stopped them was a volley of arrows coming from the trees in front. Men crumpled, and Varus watched, horrified, as even his personal guards were struck down. Now there was screaming. A veteran officer took over, barking orders and running back to marshal the defence. From the rear of the column came news that many of the baggage handlers and light troops, only recently pressed into service from local tribes, had disappeared into the woods. At that moment, they also discovered that the ravine in which they stood had been blocked with heavy felled trees. Heads up, squinting at the walls of dripping green, waiting.

When the managed public transcript begins to tear, and destabilizing information surges through the discursive media of everyday life, people gather together. Whether it be in those spaces so carefully hidden from the eye of power, the wood, the street, the public house, the coffee shop,³⁰ or in places formerly cleansed by surveillance and legalized force, such as the town square or the theatre, people group up and they talk. The temperature of this new interaction is hot, there is energy and noise, there is debate (Moscovici and Doise, 1994: 48, 60, 64 note 1). The same thing occurs when, as the public transcript breaks down, existing power-saturated and hierarchical groups in civil society suddenly find their structures of authority subjected to suspicious interrogation and open discussion (Phillips, 1991: 121).

During such disinhibited talk, people exchange information hitherto denied them, they broaden their tight focus on individual interests,³¹ they become politicized.³² Soon they have encouraged each other to see things they could not see before and found areas of mutual agreement. As solidarity and common concerns begin to co-ordinate their activities they become increasingly effective, able to use every medium of communication, to mobilize tremendous energy and to achieve co-ordination without an ornate and alienating representational structure. Indeed, just as the communicative mechanism of price co-ordinates the fragmented actors in



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a market, so this spontaneous order (Hayek, 1976, 1980) achieves effectiveness by the concerted action of individuals. The difference here is that it is not a hidden hand which takes their individual action and makes something quite different of it (Hayek, 1978), it is the determined enactment of common collective concerns. In a politics, not of institutions and laws, but of virtue and judgment, action coordination may take different forms, but it can still be effective.

The hidden transcript then bursts into view, and people are at last able to speak, to be listened to.³³ This, and the recovery of their collective power, accounts for the extraordinary sense of euphoria experienced by participants (Scott, 1990: 209, 222). The fact that people now feel they are taking control of their own affairs results in frenetic activity (Phillips, 1991: 118), a heightened confidence in their own ability³⁴ and an increase in suspicion. When implementing decisions they made themselves, people act with responsibility and commitment. This is another important way in which rhizomatic action is more effective than hierarchism, for, in the latter case, implementation of decisions (made by others) always entails a collective loss of energy, due both to foot dragging (Scott, 1990: 188) and to enforcement costs (Bowles and Gintis, 1987: 200).

But rhizomatic action also offers the possibility of a greater legitimacy than its hierarchic counterpart. Because its forms are primarily discursive, communicative and face-to-face, it presents unique opportunities for self-rule. Spared the hierarchical structures of proxy and representation, it confronts its legitimacy as ephemeral and entropic. Suspicion here must be of leadership, of unreflective obedience, of those subtle textural shifts that occur in groups as they struggle with existing institutions of sedentary power. Finding they need procedures, protocols, representatives, spokespersons, they are tempted towards hierarchical simplification.³⁵ Groups show poor judgment when they become confined to hierarchism and lazily allow their processes to lapse back into illegitimacy. Discursive assessment,³⁶ rapid, and suspicious, is required before the group can legitimately adopt some institutional relief (Baynes, 1992b: 50–69) such as the selection of a delegate, the adoption of a procedure, or some other hierarchical arrangement which secures an easing of the discursive load.³⁷ Vigilance is a virtue participants must have in abundance. If they wish to be democratic rather than authoritarian, they must be non-believers, active in their ambivalence, wide awake.

For if they are not careful, the rhizomatic quality of their interactions will be eroded. Should this occur, what was once done discursively will be taken over by particularly able, and perhaps charismatic, individuals, or by bureaucratic procedure. The group is, to use Habermas's phrase, gradually 'colonised' by instrumental forms (Habermas, 1987: 355ff.). Sartre referred to this process as 'serialisation' (Sartre, 1976: Bk. 11, Ch. 1), Moscovici and Doise (1994) as 'normalisation'. Without suspicion, the legitimacy of their decisions ebbs away. At last, fully usurped by



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
hierarchism, and thus cleansed of legitimacy, participants find themselves mere spectators of a process that was once their own. Apathetic, complaining now in secret, they watch as discussion returns to its usual power-saturated and 'normalised' (Moscovici and Doise, 1994: 62) form. Groups, now dominated by the pathology of their leaders, or co-opted and institutionalized,³⁸ offer easy confirmation of a hierarchic orientation to the problem of organization.

A hail of darts struck them from both sides. Men fell, and others crouched behind their shields. In places, pockets of troops fought as best they could, but, when they struggled across to help others, they found only smears of blood upon the grass. No bodies. Amid the screaming, the chaos and the blind thrashing at an invisible enemy, Varus cowered, trembling. He took out his sword, got down on his knees and jammed the hilt roughly into the ground. That day, 15,000 men died. They never saw their enemy.³⁹

The age old accusation of utopianism, levelled at rhizomatic action from within the confines of hierarchism, cannot be sustained by the charge that it cannot co-ordinate action. It is not this that explains the failure of political science to take seriously these radical forms, nor does it explain the absence of any serious attempt to stimulate and nurture grass-roots democracy, to develop ways that networks of groups might overcome the problems of partiality which always beset local actors in global systems,⁴⁰ to make democracy real. Rather, at the heart of the accusation of utopianism is the charge that rhizomatic action is *too* effective, dangerously so, and thus prone to violent disorder. As such, it must be controlled, protected against. Otherwise, and here is the rub, it cannot provide the safety and stability required by elites to maintain their power, in other words, by the state. Any radical politics that cannot run a state is thereby deficient.

And, of course, rhizomatic action cannot run the state. Indeed, running a state is not, after all, a suitable task for the spontaneous and ephemeral, nor for the joyful, the committed or the autonomous. It's not the sort of thing one would do if wide awake, if suspicious of illegitimacy, if wanting to be involved in the process of collective judgment. And as Lefebvre points out 'people do not revolt to change governments . . . but to change their lives' (Lefebvre, 1971: 36). It is clearly true that rhizomatic action can co-ordinate. It can effectively provide for both material and social needs. It can defeat hierarchism in the field, it can take over a whole area, culture, way of life, so fast it takes the breath away. But it cannot run states.

So let us tend to the bounded visibility of our appearances. Let us abandon the discomforts of suspicion, ignore the absurdities generated by bureaucracy and 'impartial' instrumental procedures, accept as true what hierarchism allows us to see. Let us maintain the appearance of a justice system, a free press, equal rights. Let's keep up the pretence that we care for those of us who are mad, disabled or elderly. Let's imagine that schools educate, hospitals heal, parliaments run states with efficiency and armies win. Let's pretend liberal democracy derives its legitimacy from



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popular sovereignty. If you find yourself questioning, then just look! The evidence is clear. There must be organization.

Hierarchism, a cramped and dangerous way of seeing, impairs our evaluation of other, more radical political forms. In this way, it keeps us on our knees.

Notes

- 1 Keppie (1984) includes a photograph of Marcus's cenotaph at plate 18.
- 2 Perhaps the clearest example of such a move remains that of the Frankfurt School. (See Jay, 1973.)
- 3 The most influential example is perhaps the work of Foucault.
- 4 Observable in the transition from Western Marxism into postmodern and post-structuralist theory, as well as in feminism's rejection of universalism.
- 5 See Foucault's (1983: xiii) use of the word in his 'Preface' to Deleuze and Guattari.
- 6 For his account of this model of power, see Foucault (1977).
- 7 This is the paradox articulated in Horkheimer and Adorno (1972).
- 8 See also, for similar assumptions, Freud (1961).
- 9 See the discussions of knowledge uncovered by genealogical analysis in Foucault (1980, 1984).
- 10 Marx uses the word *veruchtheit*, 'crackbrained', or 'crazy'.
- 11 This was the form of deception so brilliantly worked out in Lukacs (1971).
- 12 'Blair Rules by Market Research', *The Independent*, 13 July 1997; 'Focus Groups Feed on Politics', *The Guardian*, 14 July 1997.
- 13 Vetlesen (1994: Ch. 2) opposes his own account to that of Arendt.
- 14 See, for example, the definitional orientation of Cohen and Arato (1992).
- 15 For Habermas's commentator's benedictions to the public sphere, see Blaug (1997: 112).
- 16 Note its evolution from Almond and Verba (1963) to the description of social capital in Putnam (1993).
- 17 This is Fukuyama's view (1989). Scott in fact fails to connect his analysis of openly oppressive regimes with the seductive mechanisms of liberal democracy.
- 18 Scott (1990: 49) states that 'elites are consumers of their own performance', and at p. 67, 'the public transcript is a kind of self-hypnosis within ruling groups'.
- 19 This orientation is especially apparent in Deleuze and Guattari (1987: 149–66), where the section entitled 'How Do You Make Yourself a Body Without Organs?' singularly fails to address the practicalities of their chosen question.
- 20 For example, Fiske (1993).
- 21 See the discussion of grassroots women's activities in Cambell (1993: 319).
- 22 For the notion of 'bounded rationality', see Simon (1983).
- 23 On the blindness of organization science, see Burrell (1997).
- 24 For such an attempt, which justifies a rejection of ultra-right wing libertarian and Fascistic examples of rhizomatic action, see Blaug (1996), where I inspect the additional question of whether, and under what conditions, *some* institutionalization and adoption of organizational structures can be defended as legitimate.



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- 25 Wolin (1994a) gives a critique of such views.
- 26 Both Foucault (1980) and Deleuze and Guattari (1987) offer accounts of our individual Fascistic tendencies which contribute to our replication of injustice within groups.
- 27 See also Velleius Paterculus' description of the battle in Grant (1992: 362).
- 28 Marx had his own preferred examples, especially the Parisian uprisings of 1848 and 1871. 'It is well known', he states (1973: 59), 'how the workers, with unheard of bravery ... without leaders, without a common plan, without supplies, and for the most part lacking weapons, held in check the army, the Mobile Guard, the Paris National Guard and the National Guard which streamed in from the provinces, for five days. It is well known how the bourgeoisie sought compensation for the mortal terror it had suffered in outrageous brutality, massacring over 3,000 prisoners.'
- 29 See Virilio (1991).
- 30 Scott (1990) discusses such spaces at pp. 64, 118, 121–2 and 124.
- 31 Arendt (1961: 220–1) calls this 'enlarged thinking'.
- 32 Melucci (1988: 250) cites 'rendering power visible' as one form of symbolic challenge effected by such collective action. This was certainly an important aspect in the Women's movement (Phillips, 1991: 142) and also apparent in Mutual Improvement and Corresponding Societies.
- 33 Scott (1990) notes that one way to understand the hidden transcript is to follow Habermas and describe it as communication distorted by power. This way, when it emerges, it involves speaking with greater fairness, more legitimacy and less domination.
- 34 Flacks (1996: 102) suggests that political activists' accounts of their successes contradict theoretical denials of their effectiveness.
- 35 For problems generated for the Women's Movement by the 'star system', see Phillips (1991: 134).
- 36 Baynes (1992a: 1) discusses this in terms of 'recursive validation'. (See also Mansbridge, 1994: 59–61, and Habermas, 1988: 111–14, on compromise.)
- 37 The history of constitutionalism, particularly in the seminal discussions by Burke and Madison, has often highlighted the energy savings afforded by codified political procedures.
- 38 A process described by Ray (1993: 74) as one of 'repressive modernization'. He also, at pp. 66–8, draws attention to attempts by the state to 'displace public issues into socially isolated sub-cultures'.
- 39 See the account in Creasy (1996: Ch. 5).
- 40 Radicalism needs more than the usual discussion of 'coalition politics' if it is to form, benefit from and maintain the legitimacy of such coalitions. (For a sample treatment, see Jameson, 1984.)

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
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